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promoting development and regional integration have shaped EU-Mercosur relations.  These stand 
in stark contrast to the policies of the US, the historic hegemon in the region. This paper utilizes 
historical institutionalism to understand how the liberal tenets of EU competition policy and the 
protectionism of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have affected EU-Mercosur relations. 
Particular foci include Spain‘s role in spearheading efforts to promote EU-Latin American 
relations and the way EU competition policies directed against monopolies in Europe spurred 
increased investment in Latin America, especially the Southern Cone.  The latter prompted the EU 
to forge closer ties with Mercosur, encouraged cooperation and development programs and 
spurred regional integration and liberal trade regimes in Latin America. 
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The Shaping of EU-Mercosur Relations 
From Altruism to Pragmatism and Liberalism to Illiberalism 
 
Carolyn Marie Dudek
1
 
 
Introduction 
Since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which warned Europe to stay out of affairs in Latin 
America, the U.S. has played a central role in the region. However, in the last two decades, there 
has been a real increase in Europe‘s influence in Latin America, especially in the Southern Cone. 
The EU now outspends the U.S. in foreign aid to the region, European foreign direct investment 
has surpassed that of the U.S., and Europe has also become an important trading partner (see 
appendix).
2
 The EU‘s approach toward the Southern Cone and more specifically Mercosur is quite 
distinct from that of the U.S. While the U.S. has focused on a growth-oriented strategy under the 
policy ideals of the Washington Consensus, the EU has taken a seemingly more altruistic approach 
more concerned with the economic, social, and political well-being of Southern Cone countries.  
This approach has included promoting cooperation, development, and regional integration as 
cornerstones of EU-Mercosur relations.
3 
Why has the EU taken the foreign policy approach it has 
with Mercosur, diverging from the U.S.‘s approach? Why, if EU-Mercosur relations are so strong, 
have the regional blocks been incapable of concluding a bi-regional trade agreement? 
In the 1990s, there emerged a wave of ―new regionalism,‖ exemplified by the signing of 
the Maastricht Treaty, deepening European integration, and the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion 
that created Mercosur.
4
 ―New regionalism‘s‖ region-to-region negotiations have begun to shape 
global governance as well as promote economic liberalization, exemplified by free trade area 
agreements.
5
 Liberalism, in large part, shaped the EU‘s strategy in its attempts to finalize a free 
                                                                                                                                                              
1 I am grateful for the generous support from the Fulbright Scholar Program, Hofstra University, and Harris Manchester 
College, Oxford, which made this research possible. I greatly appreciate the time, experience, and knowledge interviewees 
shared with me, and I would especially like to thank Dr. Jose Eduardo Corbetta for facilitating my research in Buenos 
Aires.  I would also like to thank managing editor Allyson Delnore, series editor Alberta Sbragia, and the reviewers for 
their very helpful comments. 
2 ―New vision for EU-Latin America relations – briefing,‖ EUBusiness,  http://www.eubusiness.com/topics/trade/eu-latin-
america.02/ (last modified September 30, 2009) [VIEW ITEM]; ―Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Assistance 
Summary Tables, Fiscal Year 1999, 2000, 2001….,‖ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),  
http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2010 (accessed May 2008) [VIEW ITEM]; Peter Nunnenkamp, ―Foreign 
Direct Investment in Mercosur: The Strategies of European Investors,‖ in An Integrated Approach to the European Union-
Mercosur Association, ed. Paolo Giordano (Paris: Chaire Mercosur de Sciences Po, 2002), 227–244. 
3 Jean Grugel, ―New Regionalism and Modes of Governance—Comparing US and EU Strategies in Latin America,‖ 
European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 4 (2004): 603-626. [CrossRef] See also Martin Holland and Mathew 
Doidge, Development Policy of the European Union (New York: Palgrave, 2012). 
4 Sebastian Santander, ―The European Partnership with Mercosur: a Relationship Based on Strategic and Neo-liberal 
Principles,‖ Journal of European Integration 27, no. 3 (2005): 285-306. [CrossRef] 
5 Ibid.; Alfredo Robles, ―EU FTA Negotiations with SADC and Mercosur: Integration into the World Economy or Market 
Access for EU Firms?‖ Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 181-197. [CrossRef] 
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trade agreement with Mercosur. Moreover, liberalism inspired EU competition policy, which had 
an unintended result of promoting significant European investment in Latin America.
6
 
Simultaneously, Mercosur members adopted liberalization, which meant increasing privatization 
and investment opportunities for European firms.
7
 Rising European investment shaped EU-
Mercosur policy to be pragmatic and protect such investments.  
Although liberalism has shaped most EU policies, it is the illiberal and protectionist 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that has thus far prevented the completion of an EU-Mercosur 
agreement. Some scholars argue that an agreement has not emerged due to the institutional 
weakness of Mercosur.
8
 However, as some EU practitioners point out, continued negotiations with 
the EU have helped strengthen Mercosur‘s institutions, and the EU has at times negotiated with 
the individual members of Mercosur in order to forge an agreement, as it has done in the case of 
agricultural sanitary issues.
9
 If the EU could forge a trade agreement with Central America in 
2010 during the EU-Latin American and Caribbean summit, despite the region‘s lack of a strong 
institutional structure as a regional block, it seems that negotiating with Mercosur should not be so 
different.  
To understand better this seeming contradiction within EU policy, which supports both 
liberal and protectionist policies simultaneously, I shall utilize historical institutionalism to 
examine the three main issues that have shaped EU-Mercosur relations: 1) Spanish membership in 
the European Community and Spain‘s role in shaping EU-Latin American policy; 2) the emphasis 
of liberalism as an economic model on both sides of the Atlantic, which inspired regionalism in 
Latin America as well as the creation of EU competition policy; and 3) EU CAP and the tension 
between protecting European farmers and allaying discontent of Mercosur farmers.  
                                                                                                                                                              
6 Samuel Pulido, interview by author, Buenos Aires, September 11, 2006; Edgardo Gennaro, interview by author, Buenos 
Aires, November 15, 2006; Diego Molano, interview by author, Madrid, June 29, 2008; Mark Aspinwall and Gerald 
Schneider, ―Same Menu, Separate Tables: The Institutionalist Turn in Political Science and the Study of European 
Integration,‖ European Journal of Political Research 38, no. 1 (2000): 1-36; Kenneth Hamner, ―The Globalization of Law: 
International Merger Control and Competition Law in the United States, the European Union, Latin America and China,‖ 
Journal of  Transnational Law & Policy 11, no. 2  (Spring 2002): 385-387; Julian Izquierdo Zamarriego, interview by 
author, Madrid, June 27, 2008. Thirty formal interviews for this project were conducted from September-December 2006 
in Buenos Aires, Argentina and May-June 2008 in Madrid, Spain. Interviewees included:  members of the EU Delegation 
in Argentina; the President of La Rural (the major agricultural organization in Argentina); members of a political 
consulting group in Buenos Aires working on EU-Mercosur relations; Secretary of the Argentine Ministry of Agriculture; 
Director of Foreign Commerce and Database Center of the Cámara Española de Comercio de la República Argentina, 
Agriculture section of the Spanish embassy in Argentina; Felix Peña, academic and founder of EU-Mercosur business 
group; U.S. embassy economics attaché; Diego Guelar. former Argentine ambassador to the U.S. and the EU; Telefonica‘s 
Latin-American division head; member of Economics Ministry in Argentina; members of an NGO promoting development 
in Argentina utilizing EU funds; engineers from Repsol; Spanish Foreign Ministry director of commercial relations with 
Latin America; and Argentine Senator Roberto Fabián Ríos. [CrossRef] 
7 Izquierdo Zamarriego, interview by author; Pulido, interview by author. 
8 Amalia Stuhldreher, ―Mercosur and the Challenges of its Joint Trade Policy: Achievements and Shortcomings of a 
Process of Incomplete Communitarization,‖ Integration and Trade 33 (2011): 69-76. 
9 René Mally, interview by author, Buenos Aires, September 11, 2006; Pulido, interview by author; Roxanna Blasetti and 
Martín Piñeiro, with Maximiliano Moreno and Rafael López Saubidet, ―Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Other 
Obstacles to Trade,‖ in Agriculture and Agribusiness in the EU-Mercosur Negotiations: Negotiating Issues II, ed. Alfredo 
Valladão and Sheila Page (Paris: Working Group on EU-Mercosur Negotiations, Chaire Mercosur de Sciences Po, 2003), 
77-111. 
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EU-African Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) relations have served as a 
model for EU relations with lesser-developed regions and date back to the very beginning of EU 
integration.
10
 France strongly shaped EU-ACP relations, similar to how Spain has played a key 
role in shaping EU-Latin American relations, highlighting the important role some member states 
play in EU foreign relations.
11
 It seems that many of the ideas that have shaped EU-ACP relations 
have likewise shaped EU-Mercosur interactions.
12
 Thus, the following will in part utilize a 
theoretical framework that has been applied to EU-ACP relations as a way to inform an 
understanding of EU-Mercosur relations. Moreover, I shall explore the unintended global impact 
of EU competition policy. Competition policy is usually framed within a European domestic 
context and its wider implications abroad often go unexamined.
13
  
Neo-institutionalism is a useful theoretical perspective to understand better Spain‘s role 
in shaping EU-Mercosur policy, the similarity between EU-ACP and EU-Mercosur relations, the 
impact of EU competition policy on the actions of private corporations to invest overseas, and the 
illiberal nature of EU agricultural policy. Institutions in this context refer to both formal and 
informal institutions, including norms, routines, conventions, legal arrangements, and 
procedures.
14
  Scharpf (1988) was one of the first EU scholars to utilize a neo-institutionalist 
approach with his seminal article on the joint-decision trap, which called into question traditional 
approaches of international relations theory, such as neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism.
15
 Moreover, Scharpf and others have characterized the European 
Community as more like ―a single polity‖ than merely a group of independent states vying for 
influence within the Community.
16
  By contrast, the intergovernmentalist perspective asserts that 
member states are the main actors in the EU, and it is the negotiations of member states that create 
EU policy.
17
 However, in examining EU-Mercosur relations and specifically the issues shaping 
                                                                                                                                                              
10 Imtiaz Hussain, ―E.U.‘s Association Agreements & Central America: No Milk until the Cows Come Home,‖ (paper 
presented at the Council for European Studies International Conference, Boston, Massachusetts, March 22-24, 2012). 
11 Anne-Sophie Claeys, ―‗Sense and Sensibility‘: the Role of France and French Interests in European Development Policy 
since 1957,‖ in EU Development Cooperation: from Model to Symbol, ed. Karin Arts and Anna Dickson (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2009), 113-132. 
12 Hussain, ―E.U.‘s Association Agreements & Central America.‖ 
13 Michelle Cini and Lee McGowan, Competition Policy in the European Union (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
14 Aspinwall and Schneider, ―Same Menu, Separate Tables,‖ 3, 39; James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering 
Institutions:  the Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989); B. Guy Peters, Theory in Political 
Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’ (New York: Ashford, 2005), 47-70. 
15 Fritz Scharpf, ―The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration,‖ Public 
Administration 66 (1988): 239–278; Aspinwall and Schneider, ―Same Menu, Separate Tables,‖ 2. [CrossRef] 
16 Scharpf, ―The Joint-Decision Trap,‖ 239–278; Paul Pierson, ―The Path to European Integration: A Historical 
Institutionalist Analysis,‖ Comparative Political Studies 29 (1996): 123-163 [CrossRef]; Renaud Dehousse, ―Community 
Competences: Are There Limits to Growth?‖ in Europe after Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union, ed. Renaud Dehousse 
(Munich: Beck, 1994), 103-125; Giandomenico Majone, ―Regulatory Federalism in the European Community,‖ 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 10 (1992): 299-316. [CrossRef]  
17 Andrew Moravcsik, ―Preferences and Power in the European Community: a Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach,‖ 
Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (1993) [CrossRef]; Geoffrey Garrett, ―International Cooperation and Institutional 
Choice: The European Community‘s Internal Market,‖ International Organizations 46 (1992). 
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free trade negotiations, it would be overly simplistic to state that Spain in its negotiations with EU 
members is the only determining factor shaping EU-Mercosur relations. One has to take into 
account the norms shaping various policy sectors within the EU as well as the actions of member 
states whose actions are constrained by such norms and formal institutional structures. 
Historical institutionalism, a specific type of neo-institutionalism, is a useful lens for 
examining what has shaped EU-Mercosur relations. As Pierson explains, ―prior decisions form a 
basis upon which new decisions are made.‖18 Ideas help shape policies which become norms that 
end up shaping other policy decisions. For instance, liberalism inspired competition policy. 
Protection of agriculture and the EU‘s policies toward ACP countries may have started as the 
outcome of intergovernmental bargains, but they have also evolved to shape EU formal and 
informal institutions. As Dolowitz and March explain, ―policy transfer as a process in which 
knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political 
setting is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas 
in another political setting.‖19 The EU similarly has developed policies that have influenced other 
policy areas. 
For instance, liberalism emerged within the EU as a driving ideological perspective that 
permeated several policy areas. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explicate how liberalism 
was infused into the EU, but liberalism did profoundly influence the EU treaties and over time has 
become embedded in many but not all policy areas. For example, competition policy, inspired by 
liberalism, has become a supranational policy that the Commission has taken the lead in shaping; 
it has become a ―flagship for the EU.‖ 20 As Pierson points out, political development, norms, 
formal and informal institutions, and policy structures are formed over time and become 
embedded within such institutions.
21
  Liberalism is a norm that has become a significant driving 
force shaping EU formal and informal institutions and has subsequently shaped policy. 
Although intergovernmentalists may argue that Spain‘s assertiveness in forging EU 
relations with Mercosur demonstrates the central role of member states and interstate bargaining, 
the EU‘s liberalism and protectionist agricultural policies have constrained and shaped Spain‘s 
actions within the EU toward Latin America. For instance, Spain has supported a free trade 
agreement between Mercosur and the EU, yet it is only through the Commission that such 
negotiations occur. Moreover, it seems that the EU is applying a policy design to Mercosur that is 
very similar to the policies of liberalism and cooperation and development programs that were 
previously instituted as central to EU-ACP relations. Spain does not necessarily have to promote 
regionalism in Latin America or an EU free trade agreement with Mercosur, yet it seems that the 
institutional structure and norms of the EU promote such ideals.  Thus, Spain as a rational actor 
has sought to pursue its interests within the confines of what EU formal and informal institutions 
will allow. Historical institutionalism takes into account the long-term effect of how liberalism 
                                                                                                                                                              
18 Pierson, ―The Path to European Integration,‖ 133. 
19 Claudio Radaelli, ―Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy,‖ 
Governance 13, no. 1 (2000): 26. [CrossRef] 
20 Cini and McGowan, Competition Policy in the European Union, 1. 
21 Pierson, ―The Path to European Integration,‖ 128. 
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and agricultural protectionism have shaped the institutions of the EU as well as recognizes that 
while states act rationally to achieve an optimal outcome, institutions constrain those decisions.    
Rational institutionalism, on the other hand, purports that rational actors seek to 
maximize their condition but are also constrained and shaped by institutions, which are ―systems 
of rules and inducements.‖22  Rational institutionalism overcomes the pitfalls of strict rational 
choice, such as reductionism. March and Olsen assert the problematic nature of assuming that 
group behavior is simply the aggregation of individual activities, arguing that ―the concepts 
suggesting autonomous behavior at the aggregate level are certainly superfluous and probably 
deleterious.‖23  Reductionalism disaggregates collective behavior into its smallest parts, thus 
excluding the impact of the larger structures within society.
24
 
 Moreover, neo-institutionalism helps make sense of the constraints and influences upon 
actors and the interaction of actors, but it leaves out actor agency. Even within the confines of 
institutional structures, there is room for choice. Rational choice theory takes into account the 
calculation of actors but fails to account for the structures that can constrain decision-making 
actions as well as the historic progression that shapes those institutions. Thus, historical 
institutionalism can provide a more useful lens with which to examine the impact of the EU‘s 
institutional structures and norms on Spain‘s rational pragmatism with respect to EU-Mercosur 
relations as well as the impact of liberalism and agricultural protectionism on the EU‘s policies 
toward Latin America. As liberalism informed EU competition policy and shaped the institutional 
structures and constraints on member state policies, corporations had to adapt and at the same time 
seek profit maximization.
25
 As more European firms invested in Latin America and Spanish 
interests increased, EU-Mercosur relations gained greater attention within the EU. Moreover, EU-
ACP relations had shaped the institutional structures that defined the policy initiatives and goals 
more generally of EU relations with lesser-developed countries. The norms of EU-ACP relations 
and the liberalism of EU competition policy shaped the policy design of EU-Mercosur relations.
26
  
Yet protectionism, which was the basis of CAP, had been institutionalized within the EU, 
and strong agricultural countries, like France, continued to try to protect their agricultural sector 
from external competition. The dynamics of the EU‘s norms and institutions, particularly the 
Commission‘s actions in its negotiations for a free trade area with Mercosur, created a framework 
which shaped the actions of EU members and the EU.  The purpose of this paper is to give a more 
comprehensive and detailed discussion of EU-Mercosur relations in order to elucidate the 
complexity and challenges behind concluding an Association Agreement. 
                                                                                                                                                              
22 Peters, Theory in Political Science, 19; Barry Weingast, ―Rational-Choice Institutionalism,‖ in Political Science: State 
of the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), 660-692. 
23 March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, 4. 
24 Peters, Theory in Political Science, 47-70. 
25 Aspinwall and Schneider, ―Same Menu, Separate Tables,‖ 16; Molano, interview by author; Hamner, ―The 
Globalization of Law,‖ 385-387. 
26 Arts and Dickson, EU Development Cooperation; Izquierdo Zamarriego, interview by author; Pulido, interview by 
author. 
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Historical background: the 1990s and Spain’s EU membership  
Spanish membership in the European Community in 1986 helped make Latin America a 
new priority for common foreign policy as well as a new location for European investment and 
trade into the 1990s. Simultaneously, the 1990s were a period for the adoption of neo-liberal 
policies both in Europe and Latin America. As Europe deepened its integration with the signing of 
the Maastricht Treaty, Latin America was coming off a wave of democratization and saw Spain as 
an exemplar of democratization and the EU as a model of regional integration.
27
 Thus, Latin 
America tried to emulate that seemingly positive move toward both democratization and 
integration, most notably with the creation of regional blocks such as Mercosur.
28
 
These significant changes within the EU and Latin America also began to shape the 
relationship between these two regions. Much as it had in its much older relationship with ACP 
countries, the EU focused on cooperation and development with Latin America and emphasized 
the construction of bi-regional relations in order to promote regional integration in Latin 
America.
29
 The EU viewed regional integration as a way to advance development and secure 
democratization within both Latin American and ACP countries.
30
 
Some argue Latin America became a priority for Europe because it was an easy venue in 
which to improve the EU‘s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), particularly after the 
debacle in the former Yugoslavia.
31
 Since most EU members did not have direct national interests 
at stake in Latin America, it was a somewhat less controversial world region where the EU could 
establish policy coherence and demonstrate the promise and possibilities of CFSP.
32
 
Much of the EU‘s support for regional integration in Latin America emerged from its 
―bottom-up‖ approach to building democracy and addressing socio-economic concerns in the 
region.
33
 The EU‘s attitude toward Latin America is based on the premise that the region‘s 
instability emerged due to the inability or unwillingness of governments to respond to demands for 
                                                                                                                                                              
27 Vicente Palacio, ―Spain‘s Contribution to a European Vision for the Americas: A Review,‖ in Spain in the European 
Union: The First Twenty-Five Years (1986-2011), ed. Joaquín Roy and María Lorca-Susino (Miami: Miami-Florida 
European Union Center/Jean Monnet Chair, 2011), 270-279. 
28 Louise L‘Estrange Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, Regionalism in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995); Luk Van Langenhove, Building Regions: Regionalization of the World Order (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing 
Company, 2011). 
29 Grugel, ―New Regionalism,‖ 603-626; Victor Bulmer-Thomas, ―The European Union and MERCOSUR: Prospects for a 
Free Trade Agreement,‖ Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42 no. 1 (2000): 1-22.  
30 Anna Dickson, ―The Unimportance of Trade Preferences,‖ in EU Development Cooperation: from Model to Symbol, ed. 
Karin Arts and Anna Dickson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 42-59; Marjorie Lister, The European 
Union and the South (London: Routledge, 1997); Grugel, ―New Regionalism,‖ 603-626; European Commission, Latin 
America Regional Strategy Document: 2002-2006 Programming, April 2002. 
31 Andrew Crawley, ―Toward a Biregional Agenda for the Twenty-First Century,‖ Journal of Interamerican Studies and 
World Affairs 42, no. 2 (2000): 9-34.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Richard Youngs, ―The European Union and Democracy in Latin America,‖ Latin American Politics and Society 44, no. 
3 (2002): 111-139.  
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reform.
34
 Thus, the EU has sought to address the root causes of the problem and has created 
initiatives allocating funds specifically toward building civil society and supporting non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and grass roots programs.
35
 Since political and economic 
development are closely linked, the EU has also sought policies to alleviate poverty and income 
inequality.
36
 As the EU began to construct a foreign policy based on development, cooperation, 
and regional integration in Latin America, the EU also engaged in increased economic activity 
between the two regions. 
Conditions in the 1990s in both the EU and Latin America led to greater European 
investment in Latin America. In Europe, EU competition regulations, based on neo-liberal ideals, 
caused European corporations to break apart their monopolies. As a result, many European 
companies looked elsewhere to maintain or improve their profit margins.
37
 Many firms, especially 
from Spain, France, and Germany, invested in Latin America, particularly in the Southern Cone.  
For example, in Argentina, a key member of Mercosur, European firms found investment 
opportunities due to the favorable peso-dollar exchange rate and privatization programs under 
Carlos Menem‘s administration. As a result, European foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
Argentina began to increase significantly from the previous decade.
38
 In fact, in the 1990s, EU 
investors ―out-invested‖ the U.S. in Argentina and Brazil.39  By 1999, with the Spanish company 
Repsol‘s purchase of privatized oil industries, the EU reached a record high direct investment 
amounting to 19.8 billion USD and accounting for 78.9 percent of all FDI in Argentina.
40
   
According to the Argentine Ministry of Economics, European FDI focused mostly within the 
tertiary sectors or on the purchase of Argentine enterprises.
41
  Spain became one of the most 
noteworthy European investors in Argentina, accounting for 60 percent of all EU FDI between 
1992 and 1999.
42
  
Increased European investment in Latin America also laid part of the groundwork for a 
new and greater European presence in Latin America, which impacted the U.S.‘s previously more 
dominant role in the region. Although relations in Latin America are not a zero-sum game—that 
is, a greater European presence does not exclude a strong U.S. presence—nonetheless, increased 
European investment has prompted stronger European activity in the Western Hemisphere.  
                                                                                                                                                              
34 Crawley, ―Toward a Biregional Agenda for the Twenty-First Century,‖ 9-34. 
35 Jean Grugel, ―Romancing Civil Society: European NGOs in Latin America,‖ Journal of Interamerican Studies and 
World Affairs 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 87-107. [CrossRef] 
36 Crawley, ―Toward a Biregional Agenda for the Twenty-First Century,‖ 9-34. 
37 Pulido, interview by author; Hamner, ―The Globalization of Law,‖ 385-387; Molano, interview by author; Gennaro, 
interview by author. 
38 Pulido, interview by author; Narodowski, Patricio, interview by author, Buenos Aires, November 10, 2006. 
39 Nunnenkamp, ―Foreign Direct Investment in Mercosur,‖ 227–244. 
40 ―La Inversión Extranjera Directa en Argentina 1992-2002,‖ Ministerio de Economia, 
http://www.mecon.gov.ar/cuentas/internacionales/otros_trabajos_inversion.htm, 18-19 (accessed May 2008). [VIEW 
ITEM] 
41Ministerio de Economia, cited in Nunnenkamp, ―Foreign Direct Investment in Mercosur,‖ 227–244. 
42 Nunnenkamp, ―Foreign Direct Investment in Mercosur,‖ 227–244. 
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Neo-liberal policies adopted on both sides of the Atlantic underlie the EU‘s new role in 
Latin America and particularly its increased investment in the larger Mercosur countries.  
Competition and deregulation policies have become significant competencies of the EU, and neo-
liberalism has inspired such policy initiatives in Europe and abroad.  Likewise, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank also utilized the neo-liberal inspired ideals of the 
Washington Consensus and influenced economic policy in Latin America.
43
 Although throughout 
the 1990s such neo-liberal policies seemed to work, the Brazilian economic downturn of 1999 and 
the Argentine economic crisis of 2001 suggest otherwise. During these crises in Mercosur 
countries, the EU‘s foreign policy strategy was to continue its focus on development and retool 
some of its initiatives as well as further promote the regional integration of Mercosur as a vehicle 
of development. Considering the massive European investment in Argentina throughout the 1990s, 
 
it seems that the change in EU policies was not simply altruistic, to promote development in the 
region for development‘s sake, but also to protect European interests. Much of European 
investment that now exists in Mercosur countries was an outgrowth of neo-liberal policies on both 
sides of the Atlantic as well as a response to pressure from international organizations such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and IMF.  
While the events of the 1990s fashioned a stronger relationship between the EU and Latin 
America, Spanish membership to the EU initiated and further shaped EU policy toward Latin 
America. Much as France has played a central role in shaping EU-ACP relations, especially 
regarding the EU and Africa, Spain has taken the lead establishing and developing EU-Latin 
American relations.
44
 The strong link between Europe and Latin America was reforged following 
Spanish and Portuguese membership to the European Community in 1986.  Most importantly, 
Spain made its membership contingent upon the Community‘s development of stronger relations 
with Latin America, and as a result, Latin America was firmly placed on the EU‘s agenda. The 
four Spanish Presidencies of the European Union in 1989, 1995, 2002, and 2010 all made Latin 
America an important foreign initiative.  
As Vicente Palacio points out, Spain ―invented Latin America as a political and economic 
regional partner.‖45 It was Spain that took the lead to forge a bi-regional approach toward Latin 
America. Spain began with an Ibero-American initiative in 1990 with King Juan Carlos and Queen 
Sofia meeting then Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The result of their meeting was a 
proposal to hold regular annual meetings with all Latin American countries. Since then twenty 
meetings have been held as of 2010.
46
 
Spain was in a unique position since it had gone through a regime transition in the late 
1970s, and Latin American countries were likewise experiencing democratic regime transition or 
consolidation during the 1990s. The obvious historical, cultural, and linguistic ties made building 
                                                                                                                                                              
43 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002). 
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45 Vicente Palacio, ―Spain‘s Contribution to a European Vision for the Americas: A Review,‖ in Spain in the European 
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political, economic, and social linkages between Spain and Latin America a natural fit.
47
   Spain 
not only sought to improve Iberian-American relations but also used its membership within the 
EU to further strengthen EU-Latin American relations. For instance, following the Spanish EU 
Presidency in 1989, the EU institutionalized annual meetings with the Rio Group. The Rio Group, 
created in 1986, originally consisted of six Latin American countries and now represents all Latin 
American countries as well as some Caribbean countries. In 1999, for the first time, EU and Latin 
American heads of state met under the auspices of an EU-Rio Group summit in Rio de Janeiro. 
The purpose of this meeting was to ―strengthen the economic, political and cultural understanding 
between the regions to encourage the development of a strategic partnership.‖48 
Spain‘s commitment to EU-Mercosur relations was exemplified by the decisive action 
taken following the Argentine economic crisis in 2001. In 2002, as the crisis sent Argentina‘s 
economy into a tailspin, the second EU-Rio Group summit was held in Madrid under the Spanish 
EU Presidency. While the summit was being prepared, there were worries that Argentina would 
disengage from Mercosur or become more protectionist.
49
 As the host of the summit, Spain took 
the lead, and the Commission decided that accelerating EU-Mercosur negotiations would be a 
good way to aid Argentina.
50
 Argentina‘s crisis prompted the EU to change its development 
programs in Argentina, called ―cooperation programs,‖ and refocus its activities to promote 
Mercosur as a way to aid in Argentina‘s recovery. Most notably, emphasis in cooperation 
programs was re-allocated, putting greater weight on social cooperation and less on economic 
cooperation. In the past, two-thirds of EU cooperation funds were allocated toward economic 
cooperation and one third toward social cooperation.  Following the Argentine crisis, the EU 
flipped the proportion of cooperation and allocated two-thirds of the total funds toward social 
development.
51
 
In 2004, the EU and Rio Group met again in Mexico, and the Declaration of Guadalajara 
established the goals and concerns between the EU and Latin America. Some of the issues covered 
in the Declaration included: a commitment to a bi-regional strategic partnership; the need to 
address human rights, democracy, inequality, social exclusion, terrorism, and drug trafficking; the 
Kyoto Agreement and global warming; and Latin American migration to Europe.
52
 The EU-Rio 
Group summits have helped establish regular talks between the EU and Latin America and have 
helped facilitate relations between the two regions. 
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The 1990s saw Spain take the lead in forging closer relations between the EU and Latin 
America; however, Spanish involvement in Latin America also came with a backdrop of greater 
Spanish investment in the region. As Palacio calls them ―the new conquistadors,‖53 large-scale 
Spanish corporations in the fields of telecommunications, utilities, energy, and banking, to name a 
few, began significant investment in Latin America, particularly in the Southern Cone. To put the 
rise in Spanish FDI into perspective, from the 1960s through the early 1970s, total Spanish FDI 
was 247 million USD.
54
 Once Spain joined the EU in 1986, total Spanish FDI rose to 2 billion 
USD by 1990.  Approximately 10 percent of that FDI went to Latin America (20 percent of that 
money went to Argentina and Chile, the largest recipients of Spanish FDI), and over 50 percent 
went to other EU countries.
55
 From 1991-1993, the EU was still the largest destination for Spanish 
FDI, accounting for approximately 60 percent; Spanish FDI to Latin American made up only 12 
percent of total flows.
56
 From 1994-1996, however, there was a significant change in Spanish 
FDI. Total Spanish FDI increased 63 percent between 1994-1996 as compared to 1991-1993 and 
had increased by 148 percent as compared to 1986-1990.
57
 Moreover, Spanish FDI to EU 
members, which had been at 60 percent following Spanish entry to the EU in 1986, dropped to 33 
percent in 1994-1996, and Spanish FDI to Latin America increased from 12 percent to 40 
percent.
58
 
These FDI figures demonstrate that Spain had a very important vested interest in Latin 
America, particularly Southern Cone countries such as Chile and Argentina. Spanish desire to 
facilitate EU-Latin American relations was due not only to Spanish historic ties with the region 
but also to quite practical reasons.  Neo-liberal pressures from abroad such as the WTO and from 
within the EU itself created both challenges and opportunities for Spanish investment, which also 
shaped Spain‘s influence on EU policy toward Latin America. 
Liberalism and EU competition policy 
Since its inception, the EU has sought liberal economic goals such as opening trade and 
creating a fair competitive environment within Europe. As a result, competition policy and 
particularly the dissolution of monopolies in the 1990s had a profound impact on several 
industries throughout Europe. The EU has promoted economic liberalism not only at home but 
also in its foreign relations as a means for advancing development.
59
 That said, some scholars 
point out that a major inconsistency in EU foreign policy and the promotion of liberalism is CAP‘s 
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illiberal protectionism of EU farmers and agriculture.
60
 I will further explore this seeming tension, 
but overall, liberalism remains a major component of EU policies at home and abroad.  
In its foreign relations, the EU has made a conscious effort to promote liberalism within 
underdeveloped world regions such as ACP and Latin America and in particular to promote 
regional integration.
61
 EU policy toward Latin America, including Mercosur, has focused on 
development and cooperation, as well as on maintaining bi-regional relations rather than bi-lateral 
ones.
62
 Bi-regional relations refer to the EU acting as a block negotiating with other regional 
blocks rather than negotiating with individual countries.  The U.S. has chosen a very different 
strategy and even attempted to sign a trade agreement with Uruguay, even though it would mean 
Uruguay would have to abrogate the Asuncion Agreement, which founded Mercosur, to do so.
63
  
EU negotiations to create an Association Agreement with Mercosur began in 1999 but 
have still not resulted in an agreement. In October 2004, the negotiations were suspended, but 
hope for concluding an agreement re-emerged in 2006 with the WTO Doha Round, which 
subsequently failed. The EU Delegation had high expectations that EU-Mercosur negotiations 
would be concluded as an alternative to a WTO agreement.
64
 It should also be noted that EU 
officials believe that the negotiations with Mercosur also are a way to help build the institutional 
structure and deepen the integration of Mercosur.
65
 From 2004 until 2010, negotiations remained 
at a standstill, and the EU‘s policy of bi-regional negotiations seemed to be failing.66 During this 
time, the EU was only able to conclude Association Agreements with Mexico and Chile and still 
could not conclude agreements with the Andean Community or Mercosur. The EU ended up 
signing free trade agreements with Mexico and Chile that were put into force in 2000 and 2003 
respectively. The EU also moved to create a free trade agreement with the Andean Community, 
but when the Andean Community fell apart, the EU concluded free trade agreements with 
individual countries Peru and Colombia in 2010.  
These bi-lateral agreements seemed to occur in the face of the EU‘s attempt to encourage 
regional integration in Latin America and to promote bi-regional negotiations. The EU‘s inability 
to finalize an agreement with Mercosur or the Andean Community suggested that the EU had 
given up on the policy and had taken the approach of seeking whatever trade agreements it could 
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even if the agreements were not bi-regional. The EU especially sought agreements with countries 
that had signed free trade agreements with the U.S., such as Mexico and Chile.  
The EU-Latin American and Caribbean Summit (EU-LAC) in May 2010 signaled a re-
birth of EU bi-regional relations. The EU-LAC summit finalized negotiations for an Association 
Agreement between the EU and six Central American countries and also reinvigorated dialogue 
about concluding an agreement with Mercosur. Interestingly enough, at the time of this article‘s 
writing, the U.S. had still not ratified proposed free trade agreements with Colombia or Panama, 
whereas the EU had done so as part of the EU-Central American agreement. As the European 
Commission, Directorate General for Trade memo states, ―The Agreement (with Central America) 
is also meant to reinforce regional economic integration in Central America and the EU hopes for 
it to have a positive spillover effect on the overall political integration process and contribute to 
the stability of the region.‖67 The May 2010 Summit suggested that the EU had renewed its desire 
to promote regional integration in Latin America and to finalize an agreement with Mercosur. 
Why did it take until 2010 to renew discussion on an EU-Mercosur trade agreement? One 
argument is that by 2010 Europe had become engulfed in its own economic debt crisis and found 
that European FDI in Mercosur made up for economic losses in Europe.
68
 With Spain holding the 
EU presidency, despite resistance from ten EU member states led by France who do not want to 
resume negotiations due to agricultural interests, negotiations have been re-opened but are still not 
completed as of the writing of this article.
69 
Liberalism has remained a cornerstone of the EU‘s policy toward Latin America with 
regard to both promoting regionalism and forging free trade agreements. Liberalism has likewise 
become important for EU-ACP relations, which were forged well before EU-Mercosur relations. 
EU relations with ACP countries and specifically the tone of the Cotonou Agreement may shed 
some light on the EU‘s strategy toward Latin America, particularly the new emphasis on liberal 
trade without trade preferences. In the past, the EU‘s dealings with both ACP countries and Latin 
America promoted cooperation and development; however, more recently there has been a shift in 
the underlying policy style of how to achieve that goal. The EU has moved away from trade 
preferences and now focuses more on principles of neo-liberalism to promote cooperation and 
development.
70
 The Cotonou agreement with ACP countries suggests that, in order to incorporate 
lesser-developed countries into the global economy, trade preferences should be abandoned and 
liberal trade should be embraced.
71
 The ACP agreements of the past seemed to be unique and 
focused on cooperation, development, and preferential trade agreements, while Cotonou seems to 
be less unique and to adopt neo-liberal policies much like other international organizations, such 
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as the World Bank and WTO.
72
  As Toye explains, in the 1980s there emerged a counter–
revolution in development that advocated for lesser-developed countries to liberalize.
73
 
Dependency theory inspired state-led development policies and special concessions to poorer 
countries, which seemed to yield little results.
74
 Dependency theory suggested that the 
international system had disadvantaged lesser-developed countries and therefore the state needed 
to step in to solve development woes. Neo-liberalism argued that countries should receive no 
special treatment and the state should not play a greater role and was actually to blame for 
implementing inadequate policies that exacerbated underdevelopment.
75
 As newly industrializing 
countries were on the rise, the development community began to accept the notion that market 
liberalism was the key to development.
76
 So if the Cotonou Agreement asserted that ACP 
countries should no longer receive special treatment, then neither should Latin American 
countries.  
The goal of the EU is to promote trade between the EU and Latin America, and it seems 
that when bi-regional negotiations are not possible, the EU will work to finalize a trade agreement 
with individual countries. However, it seems that in the case of Mercosur the EU has made a 
concerted effort to promote the integration of Mercosur and to finalize an agreement between the 
EU and Mercosur rather than negotiate with individual countries. In fact, members of the EU 
delegations have asserted that negotiations themselves have promoted the continued integration of 
Mercosur.
77
 Although Mercosur is one of the oldest and most institutionalized attempts at regional 
integration in Latin America, many barriers to deepening the integration of Mercosur still exist. 
Such road blocks include economic disequilibrium among its members, differences in what each 
member wants out of integration, and governments‘ unwillingness to give up sovereignty.78  In the 
past, there was a failed attempt to implement EU cooperation programs at the Mercosur level 
across member states; thus, it was decided to have individual member states of Mercosur along 
with individual EU delegations within Mercosur members states distribute, monitor, and 
implement EU development programs.
79
 Thus, it seems that both pragmatism and economic 
liberalism have informed the EU‘s policies toward Latin America and particularly Mercosur.  
The knock-on effect of EU competition policy 
One of the EU‘s main policy responsibilities is in the area of market regulation, which 
includes the EU competition policy‘s ―deregulation and liberalization of domestic markets and 
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privatization of national monopolies.‖80 Europeanization literature suggests that EU policies can 
impact national policymaking and domestic structures and create pressures for national 
adaptation.
81
 While much of the Europeanization literature examines how the EU has shaped 
regional and national governments as well as citizens and organizations within member states and 
their interactions with the EU, it does not address how the EU has impacted private organizations 
and specifically corporations and their behavior outside of Europe, especially state-owned 
monopolies that would have to comply with new EU legislation.
82
 From a theoretical perspective, 
Europeanization literature does not help us to understand the empirical reality that EU competition 
policies‘ break-up of state monopolies created an environment that led many of these companies to 
seek new market opportunities overseas.
83
  
Historical institutionalism, however, helps make sense of why corporations acted as they 
did. Just as national governments adapted their policies due to policy pressures that built up over 
time from the EU, businesses that were once state monopolies also had to adapt to a new 
environment. Competition policy in the EU in the 1990s put pressure on large corporations to 
break up monopolies in public utilities, telecommunications, and energy.
84
 As a result, many 
corporations began to look overseas to accommodate changes in their structure and market size.
85
 
The move toward deregulation in the U.S. and the UK in the 1980s set the stage for the rest of 
Europe to adopt similar types of legislation. The EU‘s adoption of liberalization policies likewise 
influenced the policies adopted within member states.  
When Spain joined the EU in 1986, it had to fundamentally transform its economic 
policy to address the accession criteria of a liberal economy. Spain had functioned under an 
autarkic economic system under Francisco Franco‘s dictatorship. The transition to democracy in 
the 1980s was accompanied by far-reaching economic policies to open Spain‘s economy to the 
outside and to bring the country more in line with the liberal policies promoted by the European 
Commission and already adopted by other member states.
86
  As Spanish markets began to 
liberalize in the 1990s, there was both increased direct investment flowing into Spain and an 
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increase in the number of Spanish companies traveling abroad and especially to Latin America, 
which was then implementing privatization programs.
87
 Latin America was also a natural place 
for Spanish companies to invest due to the relative lack of language and cultural barriers.  
Although liberalization policies in Spain were begun under the Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español (PSOE) administration due to pressures from the EU, the conservative party Partido 
Popular (PP) took control of the government following the election of 1996, and Spain moved 
decisively toward the goal of privatizing all state-owned industries.  Privatization took place 
between 1996 and 2002; some of the most notable companies related to this discussion include 
Repsol, privatized in 1997, and Telefonica, privatized from 1997-2000.  
Repsol is an example of the new Spanish corporate diversification and investment 
overseas. Investing in Argentina was of particular interest to Repsol as a way to augment its 
upstream production, which previously was very limited.
88
 With the acquisition of oil rights in 
Argentina, Repsol became not only the largest oil and gas company in Spain but also in Argentina. 
In 1999, Repsol merged with Argentina‘s Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), a formerly 
state-owned Argentine oil company. As a result, Repsol-YPF became one of the ten largest private 
oil companies in the world, the largest corporation in Argentina, and the largest private energy 
company in Latin America in terms of assets.
89
 Regarding natural gas, in 1989 Argentina began 
deregulating the industry as part of the privatization of YPF; as a result, Repsol-YPF owns a 
dominant portion of the market in both natural gas and crude oil. Thus, Repsol-YPF has became 
Spain‘s largest firm in terms of revenue, and 40 percent of Repsol‘s profits now come from 
Argentina.
90
 
In 2000, Argentina became Latin America‘s largest natural gas producer, surpassing 
Mexico. As a result of its availability and government incentives, natural gas has become 
Argentina‘s dominant energy source, making up 45 percent of primary energy consumption in 
2002.
91
 Gas production, like many other industries, suffered during the economic crisis of 2001, 
and that decline has continued.  In conjunction with a decrease in production, the Argentine 
government began to place caps on prices to keep consumer costs down; however, this sparked 
increased consumption, which resulted in an energy crisis in 2004.  This energy crisis is still an 
issue today. The main multinational corporation that distributes natural gas in Latin America is 
Gas Natural, and Repsol-YPF owns 31 percent of this corporation.
92
 Repsol-YPF also has 
significant natural gas holdings in Bolivia, which have experienced de-investment from Repsol 
due to the Bolivian government‘s Law of Hydrocarbons, which has increased taxes and royalties 
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on oil production.
93
  Since the Argentine and Bolivian branches of Repsol-YPF are 
interconnected, the impact of Bolivia‘s populist government has had reverberations in Argentina. 
Moreover, Argentina has made agreements with Venezuela to help alleviate the ongoing energy 
crisis. 
In addition to problems with natural gas supplies, oil production also declined since its 
peak in 1998 because oil producers have not ―brought enough new capacity online to replace 
declining production from mature fields; however, the rate of decline in production has eased in 
recent years.‖94  It is hard to say whether production would have been better under different 
private firms or under state ownership. However, during the 2001 economic crisis in Argentina, 
there was resentment against foreign capital and especially Repsol. Repsol executives told 
employees not to disclose whom they worked for and not to pick up taxis in front of the large 
Repsol headquarters in Buenos Aires for safety reasons.
95
 However, Repsol-YPF has continued its 
industry in Argentina and remains a significant European investor. It is also clear that EU 
development aid to Mercosur as well as aid from individual member states, especially Spain, was 
not simply for altruistic reasons but to protect such significant European investment as that of 
Repsol-YPF. In addition, the EU‘s attempt to further Mercosur‘s integration was done specifically 
to bolster the economies and stability of Mercosur‘s members, particularly Argentina.   
Recently, Argentine President Cristina Fernandez‘s administration purchased shares of 
Repsol-YPF in order for Argentina to gain a majority of shares in the company. This infuriated 
Spain, and the EU is backing Spain in the dispute, which could be a new hurdle to completing an 
EU-Mercosur Association Agreement. There is no parallel occurrence in EU-ACP relations, and 
only time will tell if this will create a break in the historical institutionalist paradigm that informed 
relations before Repsol‘s nationalization. Argentina‘s current illiberal policy is at odds with the 
neo-liberal practice that guided EU competition policy and enticed European investment in Latin 
America as Argentina has attempted to re-nationalize and gain control of Repsol.  
Another industry that EU competition policy profoundly impacted was 
telecommunications. With liberalization and technological convergence, Telefonica, the largest 
telecommunications company in Spain, began following the model of other major international 
conglomerates like U.S.-based AOL-Time Warner, Japanese-based Sony Corporation, and French 
Vivendi.
96
 Between 1997 and 2002, Telefonica became a much more assertive private 
telecommunications corporation and began to expand into Latin America. The European 
Commission and the World Trade Organization pushed for greater liberalization in the 
telecommunications sector, and Telefonica had to follow suit.  
The EU sought to de-regulate the telecommunications sector in order to: ―defend the 
competitive position of the European telecommunications industry; the co-ordination/harmon-
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ization of services and products across member-state telecommunications systems and the 
liberalization of market access and market functions.‖97 As Adriene Héritier points out, there were 
both internal and external pressures promoting competition and de-regulation of 
telecommunications.
98
 The external factor was the need for technological innovation, which the 
Japanese and Americans were achieving due to their de-regulated markets. Internally, 
telecommunications users were pushing for more affordable and effective services. As such 
pressures were placed on EU policymakers, these pressures were transferred to member states. 
99
  
The EU‘s adoption of telecommunications liberalization policies created a coercive force that 
caused telecommunications companies throughout Europe to adjust in similar ways, including by 
investing overseas. 
Telefonica today operates in fifteen Latin American countries and is one of the largest 
fixed and mobile line providers in Latin America. One of the advantages that Telefonica had in the 
1990s, beside the obvious language facility, was its demonstrated ability to modernize 
telecommunications in a short amount of time.
100
  In the late 1980s, more and more Spaniards 
were demanding phones in their homes, and Telefonica had to very quickly modernize their 
system to accommodate the changing nature and demand for telecommunications in Spain. 
Telefonica demonstrated their exceptional ability in Spain to modernize quickly, and this helped 
show Latin American consumers that they were a capable company.
101
 
Telecommunications infrastructure is essential in today‘s globalized and high tech 
economy. Public officials, private businesses, and Telefonica itself stressed the benefit of having 
telecommunications networks not only to provide affordable communications for Latin Americans 
but also to entice more foreign capital.
102
  Telefonica uses the same technology in Latin America 
that it uses in Europe and has been able to expand the telecommunications market in Latin 
America at an affordable price for consumers.
103
 Basically, the company‘s strategy was to seek a 
greater volume of customers and a lower cost per customer, since average income in Latin 
America is much less than in Europe.  
When the economic crisis of 2001 happened in Argentina, Telefonica did not leave, 
whereas America Bell South, a U.S. firm, ended up selling its share of the market to Telefonica. 
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According to Telefonica management, Telefonica sees its investment in Latin America as long-
term.
104
 Dr. Julian Izquierdo Zamarriego, Spanish Foreign Ministry‘s General Sub-director of 
Commercial Affairs with Latin America and North America, highlighted that Telefonica did not 
leave due to the strong historic, cultural, and linguistic ties between Spain and Latin America.
105
 
Another possible reason that Telefonica did not leave Argentina was that it had too many fixed 
assets and too much invested to ―cut and run‖ like many other foreign companies did.  
Another critical issue concerning European and particularly Spanish investment in 
Argentina was the freezing of tariffs following the economic crisis. Utilities and 
telecommunications normally charge usage fees to customers, but with the economic crisis, the 
Argentine government froze fees, leaving them in pesos and not allowing companies to increase 
them. The government‘s reasoning for freezing usage fees was to help citizens with the abrupt 
change in the economic condition due to de-pesofication. The Argentine peso had been pegged to 
the U.S. dollar, but this was unsustainable. When de-pesofication occurred, the value of the 
Argentine peso was reduced by two-thirds. What companies were collecting for services from 
customers was likewise in real terms reduced by two-thirds overnight. The frozen fees issue is 
slowly being resolved as several companies have sought international arbitration at the World 
Bank‘s International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Telefonica was 
one of the companies adversely impacted by the pricing freeze. However, Telefonica was in a 
unique situation since it had experienced price-freezing in Spain and thus was better able to 
cope.
106
  
Telefonica‘s involvement in Latin America became a win-win situation for both investors 
and consumers by increasing telecommunications networks in Latin America that helped 
businesses and by providing inexpensive cell phones, Internet access, and fixed landlines to 
middle and lower income people.
107
 Therefore, Latin America and particularly Mercosur 
countries have been better able to keep up with technological advancements found in more 
developed countries.  
Telefonica, a European company, invested in Latin America as a result of coercive 
pressures from EU competition policy and the push to liberalize the telecommunications system in 
Europe. Likewise, international pressures from the IMF and World Bank promoted similar policy 
adoption in Latin America.
108
 The company‘s large investment in Latin America facilitated a 
technology transfer that gave vital communication infrastructure to promote FDI and improve 
business conditions in the region. It also provided an opportunity for citizens to become more 
connected, thereby promoting economic and social development. With such large European and 
particularly Spanish investments it is not surprising that Spain has pushed to create stronger EU-
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Latin American relations and to finalize an Association Agreement between the EU and Mercosur.      
Since many European firms have significant overseas investment and the EU is the 
institutional structure to conclude trade relations and larger scale development and cooperation 
programs overseas, it is not surprising that Spain has taken the lead in advocating a free trade 
agreement between the EU and Mercosur, along with the support of other countries that also have 
significant investment particularly in Mercosur. As historical institutionalism suggests, there are 
institutional constraints upon what countries can do to protect their overseas investments. Since 
the EU has placed development, cooperation, and bi-regional negotiations as cornerstones of its 
policies with other lesser-developed regions such as the ACP countries, it is not surprising that the 
EU would take a similar approach with Mercosur.
109
 
Impact of European investment   
Increased European investment in Latin America, specifically by Spain, has opened up 
markets for both sides of the Atlantic and has moved Europe into a much more important position 
in the southern portion of the Western Hemisphere. As a result of greater European investment, 
the EU has also taken a greater role in Latin American affairs. With greater globalization, 
including the forging of regional trading blocks, Europe has found itself in an interesting new 
global position, considering the U.S.‘s historically strong presence in Latin America. Since issuing 
the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. has played a prominent role shaping Latin American internal 
politics and has earned a reputation as a ―big brother‖ to the region, for better or worse. However, 
more recently, U.S. foreign policy emphasis has shifted to the Middle East, and Latin America has 
become less of a foreign relations priority.
110
 Both changes in U.S. and EU foreign policies have 
created new opportunities for Europe in Latin America even beyond the FDI spurred on by both 
EU and Latin American policies based on the liberalization of markets. With such liberalization 
and globalization on political, economic, and social levels, there has been much discussion about 
how these global changes have affected how various regions of the world relate with one another.  
Along these lines, Peter Katzenstein‘s book A World of Region focuses on the unipolar 
nature of world politics and the significant and central position the U.S. now plays.
111
 His basic 
argument is that the U.S. has created porous regions allowing the U.S. to penetrate globally and 
construct its imperium. However, examining changes in Latin America, I would argue that since 
the U.S. has not focused equally across its ―imperium,‖ it has presented porousness or 
opportunities for other foreign entities like European countries and the EU. In that same vein, 
commercial, economic, or political interests in a region are not necessarily a zero sum game. For 
instance, both Chile and Mexico have free trade agreements with the U.S. and with the EU. The 
U.S. negotiation of NAFTA may have sparked greater EU interest in Mexico, but member states 
also had their own commercial and economic interests to protect as well. Moreover, Bulmer-
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Thomas points out that Brazil used EU-Mercosur free trade agreement negotiations as a way to get 
concessions from the U.S.
112
 Therefore, EU interest in Latin America was not just to compete 
with the U.S. but also to protect European investments. Even in talking to both embassies, one 
finds that there is not a climate of competition, even though such competition may exist for private 
industries.
113
  
While neo-liberalism has informed both U.S. and EU policies toward Latin America, it 
has shaped the structure of the actual policies in very different ways. The U.S. Washington 
Consensus policies promoted economic growth and liberalization of markets. On the other hand, 
the EU sought regional integration and the promotion of democracy, human rights, and social 
development, much like its policies toward ACP countries.
114
 Moreover, the unintended knock-on 
effect of EU competition policy promoting investment in Latin America was to create an 
environment that promoted EU-Mercosur relations and protected European investments. The 
promotion of political, social, and economic development in the region has been central to EU 
policy toward Mercosur. Although support for development goals may seem altruistic, EU policy 
also demonstrates pragmatism in seeking to create stability by focusing on what the EU sees as the 
root of instability in the region in order to protect European investments. As much as economic 
liberalism on both sides of the Atlantic has promoted trade and European FDI in Latin America, 
liberal policies have not been adopted in all economic sectors. Agriculture still remains one of the 
sectors in both the U.S. and EU that follows illiberal policies and has seriously impeded the 
creation of an EU-Mercosur free trade agreement.   
Agricultural policy: the juggernaut 
Agriculture stands out as one of the major policy areas of conflict between the EU and 
Mercosur. Some have even called it the ―agricultural knot‖ and the main stumbling block to 
finalizing an Association Agreement. The EU imports a significant proportion of Mercosur 
agricultural goods, but the EU exports little agriculture to Mercosur countries. In 2000, agriculture 
comprised approximately 60 percent of Mercosur exports to the EU, whereas EU agricultural 
exports to Mercosur were quite limited.
115
 Pork to Argentina and Brazil and olive oil, wines, and 
champagne to Brazil were the largest EU agricultural exports.
116
 As Valladão and Paige point out, 
because EU agricultural exports to Latin America were so limited, Latin American market access 
was not a major issue from the perspective of Europe.
117
 More recent agricultural trade figures 
show a similar picture (see appendix). The significant volume of Mercosur agricultural goods 
exported to Europe, along with differences in agricultural policy on both sides of the Atlantic, 
helps explain why agriculture remains a sticking point in negotiations. Negotiations concerning 
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the agricultural sector are very complex and central to the conclusion of an Association 
Agreement. It is impossible within the context of this discussion to cover the breadth and depth of 
the disagreement on both sides regarding agricultural trade; however, I shall highlight some 
important aspects of the ―agricultural knot‖ to elucidate how agriculture has shaped and even 
halted negotiations.  
According to the Working Group on EU-Mercosur relations, the agriculture and 
agribusiness ―juggernaut‖ can be divided into three areas: market access, sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, and multifunctionality/non-trade concerns.
118
 Regarding market access, 
EU restrictions on imports have created tension between the EU and Mercosur. Mercosur 
countries seek access to larger markets for their agricultural goods in wealthier regions such as 
Europe. However, the EU has structured its agricultural policy in a very protectionist way. Imports 
are restricted, and high tariffs are placed on agricultural goods to ensure that European goods are 
better priced in European markets. Moreover, the EU subsidizes European agricultural products on 
the international market to push European goods‘ prices below market value, thus making them 
very competitive in international markets. Although the EU has partially reformed its CAP, such 
reforms have not been far-reaching enough to assuage discontent among agricultural exporters 
from Mercosur countries.  
Both the WTO and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) have regarded EU agricultural policies as protectionist.
119
 The Doha Round of the WTO 
and its failure to come to an acceptable conclusion was due to the EU and U.S.‘s protectionist 
agricultural practices and their unwillingness to yield to pressure from lesser-developed countries, 
which are more dependent on agriculture. The main point of contention between Mercosur and the 
EU and the U.S. is that Mercosur has maintained high tariffs on manufactured goods. Mercosur 
argues that it maintains those tariffs just as the EU and the U.S. continue to maintain high tariffs 
and subsidies on agricultural products. The EU contends that it has done more to open agricultural 
markets in Europe to Mercosur than the U.S. has.
120
 With all of the finger-pointing, the Doha 
Round of discussions collapsed due to the inability or unwillingness of the EU and U.S. to 
liberalize agricultural trade and of lesser-developed countries, such as those represented by 
Mercosur, to liberalize industrial trade. The Doha Round was seen as an opportunity to be seized 
in order to complete an EU-Mercosur free trade agreement.
121
 Yet, after the collapse of the 
Round, agriculture remains one of the central stumbling blocks to concluding an agreement. 
CAP was one of the original common policies of the EU and was seen as a way to ensure 
food security and sustainability.  The three main principles that guided CAP were market unity, 
Community preference, and financial solidarity.
122
 These three principles have driven CAP and 
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have created a protectionist policy that does not promote liberal global trade of agriculture. That 
being said, CAP has remained a fundamental basis of European integration.
123
 
France, as the largest agricultural producer in Europe, has been a strong opponent of 
reforming CAP. Although France was unable to stave off the CAP 2003 ―Mid-term Review,‖ 
which introduced significant reforms that de-coupled support from production, France has been 
otherwise successful in its staunch opposition to the liberalization of CAP in relation to EU-
Mercosur negotiations.
124
 As Dieter Konold points out, France maintained its strong stance on the 
protection of agriculture due to its budgetary interests and skeptical political culture towards 
liberalism.
125
 The institutional norm of agricultural protection was set even prior to the formation 
of the European Community and has continued to the present, with France leading the charge 
against reforms. With such pressure within the EU to maintain protectionist policies regarding 
agriculture, it is not surprising that market access for Mercosur agricultural goods has been 
difficult to negotiate. 
For all Mercosur countries, EU market access is important, but for a country that has 
been struggling economically, like Argentina, it is imperative for economic recovery. The second 
most important destination for Argentine exports in 2010 was the EU (17.2 percent of all 
Argentine exports), only surpassed by Brazil (22.6 percent); ranked fifth was the U.S. (5.7 
percent).
126
 Argentina‘s agricultural trade to the EU makes up approximately 65.1 percent of all 
Argentine exports to the EU.
127
 During the severe economic crisis in 2001, Argentine export 
markets did quite well since the cost of products was reduced considerably with the devaluing of 
the peso. Argentina‘s main export markets have been in agriculture, and during the crisis, the 
agricultural sector was seen as a way to improve the economic condition of Argentina.
128
 
Foodstuff prices were reduced instantly by two-thirds and thus became more competitive on world 
markets. In order for the Argentine government to take advantage of the success of the export 
agricultural sector, the government adopted a contentious policy following the 2001 economic 
crisis: the reinstatement of exports taxes, otherwise known as retentions.  
Retentions refer to federal taxes on Argentine exported agricultural goods. Under Nestor 
Kirchner‘s administration, retentions were re-instated for the first time since their removal under 
Carlos Menem‘s liberalization policies of the 1990s. Retentions are a way for the government to 
tax export producers and collect more revenue to recover from debt. Retentions are significant, 
accounting, for example, for 23 percent of soy and 20 percent of corn exports.
129
 Some argue that 
these retentions only affect the oligarchy, which is very well-off anyway; therefore, it is not a real 
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hardship on producers. However, several smaller producers sell products—such as cattle for 
mating purposes—to larger producers, and as a result, these retentions end up hurting smaller 
producers as well since they are paid less to compensate for the loss exporters will have with 
retentions. Under the administration of Cristina Fernandez, soy retentions were increased to 35 
percent, and in response, riots ensued for weeks and caused food shortages in Argentina.  
Mercosur countries and other countries are adversely affected by these retentions as well.  
For instance, in a hypothetical case, say that the retentions placed on Argentine wheat are 20 
percent. Thus, an Argentine wheat grower will have to calculate whether to sell domestically or 
overseas to a milling plant. Argentine millers will be able to buy Argentine wheat 20 percent 
lower than their Brazilian counterparts due to the retentions on exported agricultural goods, and 
therefore Argentine millers can sell the flour at a more competitive price since the raw materials 
are less expensive.  As the Argentines cry foul at Europe for subsidizing its agricultural goods by 
falsely lowering prices on the international market, the Argentines are falsely inflating their prices.  
Yet, retentions aside, there is a strong push in Argentina for Europe to liberalize trade and provide 
more market access for their agricultural goods.   
As part of European protectionist policies, quotas have been established on agricultural 
imports. One of the most well-known and often discussed quotas on Argentine goods is the Hilton 
Quota. The quota was first established increased under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade‘s (GATT) Tokyo Round in the late 1970s when the Hilton chain of restaurants wanted a 
larger supply of high quality cuts of beef in Europe.  To this day, the Hilton Quota still restricts the 
export of high quality beef to Europe. Many Argentine beef producers have demanded increases in 
the quota size but have been met with little European cooperation. 
In the past, the EU facilitated market access of agricultural goods for ACP countries 
through a tariff and quota system that gave them preferential treatment. However, the WTO and 
the banana trade wars from 1993-1999, along with the prior adoption of trade liberalization, have 
prompted an abandonment of preferential trade status for ACP countries. In the case of the banana 
dispute, the EU gave preferential treatment to bananas from Caribbean countries as a way to 
compensate for their disadvantaged landscape and smaller scale farming as compared to U.S.-
owned Latin American production, which is done on larger plantations and can be produced at a 
cheaper cost. Three U.S.-based transnational companies control most of Latin American banana 
production, which is about 83 percent of all bananas in the world market.
130
  The U.S. was 
strongly opposed to the EU‘s preferential system toward ACP bananas since it is considered 
protectionist and against trade liberalization. As a result, the U.S. brought the case to the WTO. 
The WTO ruled in favor of the U.S. and allowed the U.S. to impose sanctions, which 
negatively impacted European luxury goods. The final solution to the ―banana wars‖ was the 
adoption of the Banana Protocol, which challenged the preferential trade status established in the 
Lomé Convention. The Protocol called for a gradual shift to a tariff-only system by 2006, which 
means that ACP countries would have to compete equally with Latin American bananas unless 
they qualify for the Everything but Arms Initiative. As Dickson points out, the Lomé Convention 
―was a litmus test of the EU‘s will to defend the interests of the ACP against those of the USA and 
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Latin American banana producers.‖131 The ―banana wars‖ concerned pressure not only from the 
U.S. and Latin America but also from the WTO for the EU to reform its agricultural policy.
132
  
If the EU would apply liberalism to ACP countries‘ banana trade, why would the EU 
treat Mercosur countries any differently regarding other agricultural goods? The Cotonou 
Agreement with ACP countries, which followed the Lomé Convention, moved away from 
preferential treatment and advocated liberalism as a way for development to occur.
133
 Neo-
liberalism suggests that the special concessions that were once given to lesser-developed countries 
did not work, and it was the practice of government intervention that caused the problems.
134
 
Thus, under the guise of neo-liberalism, the EU advocated regionalism and liberalization as a way 
to bring about ACP development. This same idea was applied to Mercosur, yet the illiberal 
policies of quotas on products from Mercosur still remain. For as much as liberalism inspired EU 
competition and trade policy, the underlying goal of protecting European farmers and European 
production still rules when it comes to agriculture, and preferential treatment once given to ACP 
countries that had the longest standing agreements with the EU has now been left behind. Thus, it 
is not surprising that in the negotiations for an EU-Mercosur free trade agreement the issue of 
market access has not yet been resolved. Moreover, Argentina has adopted a policy that is just the 
opposite of that of Europe. Rather than protecting its agricultural exporters and allowing them 
greater ability to compete in the global market, the government has taken advantage of the sector‘s 
success and charged retentions on their goods, thereby hurting both large and small producers and 
disadvantaging their Mercosur counterparts. It seems that liberalism for agricultural market access 
is not put into practice on either side of the Atlantic.  
In 2001, there was an attempt to deal with market access issues with a Commission 
proposal called the ―single pocket principle.‖ While the Commission does not have the ―authority 
to liberalize agricultural products from South America,‖ the ―single pocket principle‖ was the 
notion of liberalizing 50 percent of export quotas and making the other 50 percent dependent on 
the outcome of the Doha trade talks.
135
 With the failure of the Doha Round, however, the ―single 
pocket principle‖ was untenable.  
Sanitary and phytosanitary issues have also impacted market access. Both regions have 
extensive sanitary and phytosanitary regulations found in multilateral agreements; in particular, 
the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade serve as a regulatory framework for both regions.
136
 
However, EU standards are higher than these international standards.
137
 Thus, there has been 
agreement between the EU and Mercosur countries to negotiate with each individual member of 
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Mercosur regarding sanitary and phytosanitary issues. Since Mercosur does not have a singular 
regulatory framework regarding sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, the EU must negotiate 
with each Mercosur member state. 
Several sanitary issues—such as pestilence among apples, pears, and pigs for pork 
production and too many antibiotics in honey, just to name a few—have caused the EU to stop 
importation of certain Mercosur products.
138
 Each of these issues has since been resolved; 
however, officials argue that these were merely excuses to not import competitive products.
139
 
There is a great deal of complexity to the negotiations of sanitary and phytosanitary concerns since 
the EU has higher standards and must negotiate individually with each Mercosur country. Yet, 
mistrust still exists among Mercosur countries regarding how the EU applies sanitary concerns as 
an excuse to not import the former‘s products.140  
Related to sanitary issues are concerns about animal welfare and traceability. Animal 
welfare deals with ―agricultural exploitation, transportation and slaughter.‖141 Traceability refers 
to the ―identity, history and source of a product.‖142  Traceability is necessary to ensure certain 
standards and to enable officials to trace a product to its origins should there be a problem with a 
product. Both animal welfare and traceability pose problems in the negotiations between the EU 
and Mercosur. Although Mercosur countries do not practice intensive or confined animal 
production, Mercosur countries reject the inclusion of animal welfare in the negotiations. The EU 
has been insistent on its inclusion and disagree with Mercosur concerning some aspects to animal 
welfare; such disagreements will have to be resolved.
143
 Regarding traceability, Mercosur does 
not have a common regulation for the practice. There are variations among Mercosur members 
regarding traceability standards, and creating identification procedures and databases to fulfill 
traceability regulations could be quite expensive. Traceability was left out of the EU-Chilean free 
trade agreement, but Chile is not a large agricultural producer, whereas the Mercosur countries 
are. Thus, the disparity in sanitary regulations and related regulations of animal welfare and 
traceability will be very difficult to remedy and will remain a difficult area to negotiate.  
At the 1992 Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, multifunctionality was introduced as a 
new concept on the international stage, and due to differing opinions about its trade implications, 
it emerged as a point of contention during the review of the GATT Agreement on Agriculture in 
1999. Multifunctionality refers to issues such as food security, socio-economic concerns of rural 
communities, food quality, and safety and the environment.
144
 The basic idea behind 
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multifunctionalism is that agriculture is not just about food ―but also [about] sustaining rural 
landscapes, protecting biodiversity, generating employment, and contributing to the viability of 
rural areas.‖145 The EU has played an important role developing multifunctionality and remains 
one of its most active proponents.
146
  Multifunctionality was formalized within Agenda 2000 with 
an emphasis on agro-environmental concerns and the inexorable link between agriculture and rural 
development.
147
  
Although multifunctionality is proposed as a ―Green Box‖ support, or one that does not 
impact trade or constitute price supports, many countries of the Cairns Group, of which all 
Mercosur countries are members, have viewed multifunctionality with great suspicion.
148
 In 
particular, the Cairns Group asserts that although multifunctionality is considered a non-trade 
concern, in practice it does impact trade. EU subsidies on exports and the past practice of 
production supports that led to overproduction in agriculture and environmental degradation as a 
result of CAP have lessened the credibility of the EU‘s claims to support multifunctionality. If the 
EU desires the preservation of rural communities and small farmers, then EU supports for exports 
seem to run counter to EU beliefs, as these supports severely harm the well-being of rural 
agricultural communities in non-European countries. As Potter and Burney point out, 
multifunctionality regarding environmental issues is not trade-distorting in and of itself; however, 
the design of the policy for subsidies can have trade-distorting effects.
149
     
One of the most controversial issues related to multifunctionality is the export of GMOs 
to the EU. From an EU perspective, GMOs fit under multifunctionality since within Europe there 
are certain health and environmental concerns related to their cultivation and consumption. The 
EU has taken a highly precautionary approach to regulating GMOs, and as a result, a twelve year 
de facto moratorium on the cultivation and importation of GMOs was put into effect.
150
 In 
response to the EU‘s ban of GMOs, Argentina and the U.S. brought a case before the WTO. In 
2006, the WTO ruled that the EU‘s moratorium on GMOs was illegal. Often the EU is criticized 
for its refusal to import GMOs since its decision is perceived as not based on science but rather 
irrational fear.
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  While GMOs were a multifunctionality stumbling block in the earlier 
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negotiations for a free trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur, it seems that the WTO‘s 
2006 ruling as well as some current changes to EU regulatory policy of GMOs has mostly lifted 
this particular barrier to negotiating a free trade agreement. However, Mercosur countries as 
members of the Cairns Group still perceive the EU‘s allegiance to multifunctionality regarding 
agriculture as simply a ruse to continue to introduce illiberal policies under the guise of what the 
EU claims to be a non-trade concern.  
In negotiating a compromise on agriculture that would be acceptable to both the EU and 
Mercosur, other issues of contention have emerged regarding not only agricultural issues but also 
industrial trade. On the issue of agricultural trade, the EU has also taken issue with denomination 
of origin trademark names, such as champagne and other wines, Parmesan cheese, and other 
agricultural products that are named after the European locations from which they originated.  
Regarding non-agricultural industries, there has been some discussion regarding a change in EU 
agricultural policies in return for a change in Mercosur‘s high tariffs on manufactured products. 
The Doha Round collapse and a free trade area between the EU and Mercosur is still on hold due 
to the reluctance of the EU to drop subsidies to European farmers and tariffs on imported products 
and of Mercosur countries to decrease tariffs on manufactured goods. 
Conclusion 
The inability to of the EU and Mercosur to conclude a free trade agreement begs two 
questions: why do the EU and Mercosur even want an agreement, and what are the barriers to 
achieving an agreement? An historical institutionalist perspective makes it possible to better 
analyze and answer both of these questions. Liberalism has inspired many EU and Mercosur 
policies, along with their member states‘ policies. Of course, the degree of the application of 
liberal policies varies from country to country and between the two regional blocks. Over time, 
however, as historical institutionalism purports, liberalism has shaped the formal and informal 
institutions of the regional blocks, which set the parameters within which state and non-state 
actors can operate. In the context of the EU, competition policy became an integral supranational 
policy that constrained monopolies in Europe. In response to this institutional reality shaped by 
liberalism, by the 1990s many monopolies and state-run industries were privatized and forced to 
decrease their market share. In response to the change in the ―rules of the game,‖ companies had 
to adjust and seek new markets. As the EU and U.S. adopted greater liberalism and with pressure 
from the World Bank, IMF, and WTO, other parts of the globe, such as Latin America, adopted 
similar neo-liberal strategies. Thus, as European companies were looking for new markets, market 
opportunities emerged in Latin America with the latter region‘s similar adoption of privatization.  
Historical institutionalism does take into account the role of actors and, in the case of the 
EU, the role of member states and their desire to act in their own best interest.
152
 Member state 
actions, however, are shaped and constrained by formal and informal EU institutions that have 
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been constructed over time.  Spain has played a central role shaping EU-Mercosur relations, not 
only due to its historic links to the region but also because of its significant investment in the 
region. EU competition policy, inspired by liberalism, constrained state-run monopolies in Europe, 
and as a result, these companies looked elsewhere and invested in places that had stable and open 
economies. Latin America‘s regime transitions and economic liberalization made it a prime 
location for European and particularly Spanish investment. As the cases of Telefonica and 
Repsol‘s significant investments in Latin America suggest, the EU‘s competition policy 
framework prompted these companies to seek investment opportunities outside of Europe.  
As European investment in Latin America and particularly Mercosur countries increased, 
so too did EU interest in forging closer relations with Mercosur.  This was manifested in part by 
the EU‘s promotion of seemingly altruistic goals such as development, cooperation, and regional 
integration in Latin America for the betterment of the region, but one could also argue that a 
pragmatic impulse to protect European investment in the region also underlies the EU‘s policy. 
The norms underpinning the EU‘s policy toward Mercosur are very similar to those that inspired 
EU-ACP relations—grounded in development, cooperation, and the promotion of regional 
integration. As EU-ACP relations under Cotonou involved seeking liberalization as a way to 
promote development, so too have EU-Mercosur relations taken a similar path by seeking the 
pragmatic goal of development in order to provide security for European FDI in the region. 
Liberalism, however, does not inform EU agricultural policy. CAP was based upon 
protectionist ideals, and from the EU‘s perspective, agriculture is not just about food production 
but also includes multifunctionality and safety concerns. As a result, the illiberal norms and ideals 
that have shaped CAP have also shaped the EU‘s position regarding agricultural trade with 
Mercosur. Mercosur exports to Europe are predominantly in the agricultural sector, and the EU‘s 
illiberal practices have created an ―agricultural knot‖ in EU-Mercosur relations, which has been a 
major stumbling block to finalizing negotiations for an Association Agreement.    
During the 1990s and beyond, it is clear that the EU, its member states, and its private 
industries have taken a greater interest in Latin America, which historically has been under the 
hegemony of the U.S. As the U.S. has shifted its policies to focus on other world regions and is 
often seen negatively as an imperial power, many Latin American countries are looking to Europe 
as a new, more benevolent large investor in the region. Along with economic development, the 
EU‘s sizable developmental aid and focus on human rights and democratization has made the 
region ―porous,‖ much in the same way that Katzenstein asserts the U.S. has done with many 
regions.
153
 However, as the EU becomes a more important player in Latin America, it will also 
have to watch the impact its policies have on these countries, the goals that the EU has set forth to 
promote regionalism in Latin America, and ultimately the successful negotiation of an Association 
Agreement between the two trade blocks.  Moreover, current policies in Mercosur countries, 
namely Argentina‘s attempt to nationalize Repsol, could create a further obstacle to finalizing an 
agreement between Mercosur and the EU. 
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Appendix 
Graph 1: EU FDI in Mercosur 
 
Sources:  
European Commission, DG Trade. ―EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World,‖ Brussels, January 18, 2011. Eurostat, 
European Commission. ―European Union Foreign Direct Investment Yearbook 2008: Data 2001-2006,‖ Brussels, 2008. 
 
 
 
Table 1: EU Agricultural Imports from Mercosur as a percentage of total Mercosur 
exports 
 
Year Percentage 
2006 50.1 
2008 52.4 
2010 51.3 
Source: European Commission, DG Trade. ―Mercosur EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World,‖ Brussels, June 8, 2011. 
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Table 2: EU Agricultural Exports to Mercosur as a percentage of total EU exports 
 
Year Percentage 
2006 3.7 
2008 3.6 
2010 4.0 
Source: European Commission, DG Trade. ―Mercosur EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World,‖ Brussels, June 8, 2011. 
 
Table 3: Mercosur’s Trade with Main Partners (2010) 
 
Mercosur Major Import Partners 
 
Rank Partner Mio euro Percent 
1 EU 27 41,471.6 20.0 
2 USA 30,910.4 14.9 
3 China 28,895.7 13.9 
 
 
Mercosur‘s Major Export Partners 
 
Rank Partner Mio euro Percent 
1 EU 27 43.044.5 20.6 
2 China 29,017.7 13.9 
3 USA 17,697.0 8.5 
 
Source: European Commission, DG Trade. ―Mercosur EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World,‖ Brussels, June 8, 2011. 
 
 
